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Rational Decision Making in Primates:
The Bounded and the Ecological
m m µ µ
Jeffrey R. Stevens

A young female rhesus macaque steals furtive glances at the male off to her right. He
just arrived to the territory and therefore
immediately piques her interest. The alpha
male, however, sits a few meters off, basking in the sun. Being in estrus, the young female faces a choice: solicit a mating from the
alpha male or follow the unfamiliar male into
the brush to sneak a mating with him. Mating with the alpha male almost guarantees
“good genes” for her offspring. But something pushes her toward the unfamiliar male.
Mating with him reduces the probability of
inbreeding and adds a bit of genetic diversity to her offspring. Additionally, mating
with the new male could act as an investment in the future: The current alpha male is
getting old, and befriending a prospective alpha male could yield future benefits. In addition, spreading the possibility of paternity
may secure protection for the offspring. Yet,
this mating also involves risks. Males often
vocalize while mating, which attracts the attention of other males. If the unfamiliar male
vocalizes, the alpha male may attack the female. Should she take the safe option or risk
punishment for possible future payoffs?
Primates constantly face decisions that
influence their survival and reproduction.
Continue foraging in this tree or move on to
another? Expose oneself to a hidden predator by straying from the group or enjoy
the safety of having other potential victims
nearby? Defend one’s territory from invaders
or abandon it and seek a new home? In all of

these cases, primates must trade off the costs
and benefits associated with uncertain and
delayed decision outcomes. The outcomes of
these choices influence survival and reproduction, and natural selection should favor
those individuals whose choices lead to the
propagation of their genes.
The vast majority of economic analyses of
decision making define good or “rational” decisions as those consistent with a set of mathematical principles. Yet, this ignores the evolutionary pressures on decision making for
the sake of mathematical elegance (Kacelnik,
2006; Stevens, 2008). Meanwhile, the standard
psychological view of decision making seeks
to empirically undermine the economic theory but cannot offer an alternative explanatory theory. Here, I emphasize an evolutionarily informed framework for studying
decision making: the bounded and ecological rationality approaches (Gigerenzer et al.,
1999). Though these approaches have traditionally focused on human decision making,
they are just as relevant for other species, including other primates. To illustrate the relevance of bounded and ecological rationality
to the study of primate decision making, I begin by introducing various visions of rationality found in the economic and psychological
study of decision making. I then explore how
primate studies inform three aspects of decision making: utility, uncertainty, and time.
Together, these aspects will guide our understanding of the evolutionary origins of primate and human rationality.
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Visions of Rationality
Rationality means different things to different people. Kacelnik (2006) proposed that
rationality refers to decisions that are either (1 ) consistent with expected utility maximization for economists and psychologists,
(2) consistent within the self for philosophers,
and (3) consistent with fitness enhancement for
biologists. Of particular relevance here are
the economic, psychological, and biological
views. A review of these visions of rationality will frame the question, “Are primates rational decision makers?”
Rational Choice
Which would you prefer: receiving two
bananas with certainty or receiving either
one or three bananas with equal probability? Depending on whether you like bananas
and your level of hunger, this may be tricky
to answer. These questions of decisions under risk mirror fundamental choices that we
and other animals frequently face. Very little in life is certain, so all organisms choose
between options without knowing the exact
consequences.
Economists have approached the question of uncertainty by developing expected
utility theory (reviewed in Wu et al., 2004)
. In expected utility theory, three features
characterize all options: magnitude, utility, and probability. Magnitude (x) refers to
the amount of the benefit (or cost) associated
with the option. Utility (u) is the mapping of
magnitude onto some measure of satisfaction
or “goodness.”1 Finally, probability (p) is the
chance that the outcome occurs. Thus, if one
faces risky options, the expected utility is EU
= p × u(x ), where utility is some function of
magnitude. Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947) formalized expected utility theory to
show that following specific mathematical
principles maximizes expected utility. Therefore, expected utility acts as a normative
standard for what decision makers should
maximize when making risky choices.
Expected utility maximization assumes
consistent choice, which requires a number of principles to hold (reviewed in Luce
& Raiffa, 1957; Rieskamp et al., 2006b). First,
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choices must be transitive, meaning that a
fixed order of preference exists. If an individual prefers bananas over apples and apples
over oranges, then he or she must prefer bananas over oranges to maintain transitivity.
Second, when transitive, choices are also independent from irrelevant alternatives, meaning the relative preference between options
should not be affected by the presence or absence of other options. If bananas are preferred to apples, the addition of watermelons to the choice set should not affect the
banana/apple preference. Finally, choices
must be invariant, meaning that option A is
preferred to B regardless of presentation format. If endowed with a banana and an apple
and asked to give up one, preferences should
be the same as if asked to choose freely between a banana and apple. Given these and a
few other principles, one can show that preferences follow expected utility calculations.
Irrational Choice?
Not long after von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) published the principles of expected utility theory, cracks began appearing in the mathematically elegant framework
when data showed violations of expected utility predictions (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961).
Soon afterward, Kahneman and Tversky
started a cottage industry of demonstrating violations of the theoretical predictions (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Kahneman et al., 1982;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In both experimental settings and in real-world decisions,
laypeople and experts made “ irrational”
choices.2 Subjects showed intransitivity, irrelevant alternatives changed preferences, and
the framing of decision questions greatly influenced preferences. Economists minimized
the problem by calling these findings “anomalies,” whereas psychologists emphasized their
robustness and labeled them “biases.” To psychologists, expected utility theory was deeply
flawed because it rested purely on mathematically derived principles and not what we
know about human behavior.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) injected a
bit of psychological realism into decision theory when they proposed prospect theory. Instead of using a utility function character-
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ized over total wealth, prospect theory uses
a value function v(x) relative to a reference
point. So with 100 bananas in the bank, a decision maker would view a choice between
gaining one and losing three bananas as a
choice between 101 and 97 bananas from the
expected utility perspective but a choice between gaining one and losing three from the
prospect theory account. In addition to altering the reference point of the value function,
prospect theory integrated data about probability perception into the equation by adding
a decision weight function to the probability. Thus, instead of having a linear relationship between the objective probability and
the perceived probability, prospect theory assumes that people tend to overestimate low
probabilities and underestimate high probabilities. The probability, then, is weighted by
the function π(p) . Thus, prospect theory predicts that preferences depend on which option has the highest value V = π(p) × v(x). As
a descriptive theory, it nicely fits people’s
preferences (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000;
Wu et al., 2004). However, it does not explain
why we have reference points or nonlinear
value functions—it takes these as givens and
describes how they influence decisions.
Bounded and Ecological Rationality
Expected utility theory is mathematically
elegant but fails to account for many of the
data. Prospect theory fares much better descriptively but lacks explanatory power. Parameters in the models are fit to the data,
with no a priori predictions about parameter values. Prospect theory therefore offers a
slight modification of expected utility theory
by patching a few of the holes that data have
poked into the theory. But both theories face
a more fundamental problem. Namely, neither of these theories adequately addresses
two crucial components of decision making:
the structure of the mind and the structure of
the decision-making environment. Early in
the study of decision making, Simon (1955,
1956) highlighted not only the study of the
mind but also the fit between the mind and
the environment. He criticized the unrealistic assumption that decision makers have infinite time to decide, full knowledge of the
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problem, and unlimited computational resources to find an optimal solution to a decision problem. This vision of unbounded
rationality contrasts sharply with what we
know about human cognition and decision making, so Simon proposed the study
of bounded rationality—the exploration of decision making given realistic assumptions
about cognitive abilities. Real-world decision
makers lack knowledge and cannot use optimization processes to make decisions. Thus,
much previous research has ignored cognitive processes at work in decision making
(but see Payne et al., 1993). The bounded rationality approach calls for realistic models of the decision process based on what we
know about cognition rather than on a set of
mathematical principles. Knowing the underlying process can help us better understand the decisions. Yet, Simon emphasized
that studying only the mind gives you but
half of the picture.
To fully understand decision making,
we must embed the mind in the environment. Gigerenzer and colleagues (1999) have
termed this ecological rationality—the match
between a decision mechanism and the environment. The unbounded rationality approach assumes that expected utility works
in all decision-making situations—it applies
universally. Ecological rationality, however,
appeals to the evolutionary idea that adaptations match the environment in which they
evolved. Therefore, decision mechanisms
should not be universal and domain general but specifically tailored to the environment in which they operate (Barkow et al.,
1992) . In fact, ecological rationality suggests
that we do not possess a single, complex decision-making mechanism used in all contexts. Rather, we have an “adaptive toolbox”
of mechanisms (including simple heuristics
or rules of thumb) that, when used in the appropriate environment, perform quite well
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999). This perspective,
then, offers an explanation for the anomalies
and biases seen by the experimental economists and psychologists. Rather than being evidence for flawed thinking and irrationality, we are simply putting these decision
mechanisms in an unfamiliar and artificial
environment—the experimental laboratory.
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In general, however, our decision mechanisms serve us quite well by exploiting critical aspects of the environment.
Both bounded and ecological rationality offer appealing alternatives to the standard unbounded approach because they
rest on realistic evolutionary principles instead of mathematical formalizations. Comparative analyses provide a unique method
for testing questions of bounded and ecological rationality because we have great variability across species in their ecological environments. Primates offer an ideal group
of species for these investigations because
their phylogenetic proximity allows us to
test interesting hypotheses about the evolution of human decision making. With this
framework in hand, we can now review the
bounded and ecological rationality of primate decisions. Note that here I focus on
what has traditionally been termed “individual decision making.” Though it is likely
impossible to completely extract an individual from the social environment (Stevens &
King, in press) , for the purposes of this review I will put aside the exciting and complicated world of social decision making in
primates and refer the reader to Maestripieri (Chapter 19) or Rosati, Santos, and Hare
(Chapter 7). Instead, I will focus on three important components of individual decision
making3: utility, uncertainty, and time.

Utility and Preference
Utility refers to the mapping of the magnitude of a benefit or cost onto some measure
of “goodness” or goal achievement (Baron,
2000), and a utility function describes this
mapping. Utility itself is difficult to assess,
so typically we measure choices to infer preferences. For expected utility theory to work,
preferences must follow the principles mentioned previously: transitivity, independence
of irrelevant alternatives, and invariance.
It is well established that humans violate
these principles, deviating from the normative standard (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000).
The question remains, “Is this the appropriate standard?” Examining choices in other
species can address this question, because
if other species also show the biases, then
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we likely are using the wrong standard. Do
other primates violate these standards, suggesting deep evolutionary roots, or do only
humans show these violations?
Transitive preferences 4 are not well studied in primates. Though other species seem
to show intransitivity (Shafir, 1994; Waite,
2001b), few data exist for primates, so we
will not consider transitivity here.5
The principle of independence of irrelevant
alternatives implies that previously available
options should not influence the current preferences (Simonson & Tversky, 1992). Waite
(2001a), however, found that the background
context does matter for gray jays (Perisoreus
canadensis). When required to pay a lower
relative cost for food in previous choices, the
birds reduced their preference for that option
later when required to pay a higher relative
cost. Tinklepaugh (1928) found a similar result in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and
long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis).
These monkeys observed an experimenter
place a banana under one of two cups. The
monkeys then immediately chose the correct cup and received the banana. However,
in some trials, the experimenter substituted a
piece of lettuce under the cup, unbeknownst
to the monkeys. When the monkeys lifted the
cups and found the lettuce, they rejected the
less-preferred food item. Though outside of
this context the monkeys readily consumed
lettuce, they refused to eat it when expecting
a banana. Thus, preferences are not fixed but
depend on previous options.
Tinklepaugh’s data suggest that the monkeys do not have absolute preferences. If
they did, they would always consume the
lettuce because it is always better than nothing. However, the preference for consuming lettuce is relative to the previous availability of the highly preferred banana. The
preference is relative to an expectation of
other options. There are good, adaptive reasons for avoiding absolute preferences. For
instance, it is well known in foraging theory that optimal choices depend on the background environment. If the environment is
rich, animals should “skim the cream” and
choose to invest little time in extracting food
from patches; if, however, the environment
is poor, they should more thoroughly ex-
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ploit the patches (Stephens & Krebs, 1986).
Houston (1997) argued that since the current choice is incorporated into the estimate
of the background environment for the next
choice point, preferences can change for the
same set of options depending on the previous background environment. Thus, relative
preferences can result from an ecologically
rational mechanism of adaptive decision
making.
The classical economic approach to rationality also assumes that decision makers have strictly ordered preferences that
are invariant to extraneous characteristics
of the choice situation. If an agent prefers
A to B, it should always prefer A, regardless of whether one is buying or selling A, or
whether other choices are made before the
A/B choice, etc. A common violation of invariance found in behavioral economics is
the endowment effect. This phenomenon occurs when decision makers have a higher
preference for an object when they own it
(Kahneman et al., 1990). In humans, this is
typically demonstrated by showing that subjects require a higher price to sell an object
they possess than to buy the same object.
Brosnan and colleagues (2007) tested similar
effects in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) by offering them a choice between two different
food items and recording their preferences.
The experimenters then endowed the chimpanzees with one of the items and measured
their willingness to trade for the other item.
The choice preferences and trading preferences did not match, suggesting an endowment effect. Similar results have been found
for brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella;
Lakshminarayanan et al., 2008). Though
anomalous to economists, an evolutionary perspective provides an explanation for
the endowment effect. The question of why
owners fight harder than intruders to maintain a resource has a long history in behavioral ecology (Hammerstein, 1981; Krebs &
Davies, 1993; Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976)
. Ownership has its privileges, including additional knowledge about a resource. Even
without direct benefits, as an arbitrary rule,
respecting ownership can avoid costly conflicts. Thus, owning a resource can increase
its value.
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Utility Building Blocks
Simon’s (1955, 1956) vision of bounded rationality emphasized realistic assumptions
about the cognitive abilities of decision makers. Applying this perspective suggests that
we need to consider both the cognitive building blocks or evolved capacities needed for exhibiting preferences and the limits placed on
these capacities.
Magnitude Perception
A critical component of exhibiting preferences is the ability to perceive differences in
magnitude between options. Preferring two
bananas to one requires discriminating between the amounts two and one. There are
many mechanisms used to quantify objects in
the world, and many studies have explored
these mechanisms in primates (reviewed in
Brannon, 2005a,b; Hauser & Spelke, 2004).
Brannon et al. (Chapter 8) provide a useful
overview of primate quantification in this volume, but it is worthwhile to briefly describe
two of these mechanisms. The first mechanism discriminates between quantities only
approximately via the analog magnitude system. Importantly, the discriminations follow Weber’s law: Variance in the representation increases with magnitude (Gallistel,
1990). This results in the ratio between quantities rather than the absolute magnitude driving the discrimination. The approximate number system yields a limit to the precision with
which individuals can discriminate magnitudes, with larger magnitudes being more difficult than smaller ones (Figure 1). In addition
to the approximate system, both humans and
other primates seem to have a precise system
that tracks individual objects. With this system, individuals can enumerate discrete quantities but only up to a maximum of three or
four objects (Hauser et al., 2000). Therefore,
the precision that primates can exhibit in their
preferences depends on the magnitude of the
amount: They can precisely choose between
small amounts and approximately choose between larger amounts.
The standard rationality approach would
assume that if an organism has the more
precise system, it should use it when mak-
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Figure 1. Weber’s law states that the variance around estimates of quantity increases with magnitude. Smaller quantities therefore are easier to discriminate than larger quantities. For instance, there
may be little variance for estimations of three and five objects, so discriminating between them is
easy. However, the variance dramatically increases for 11 and 13 objects, and estimates greatly overlap for these durations, making them difficult to distinguish.

ing quantity judgments. However, Stevens
and colleagues (2007) showed that cottontop tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) used the approximate system in a foraging task, even
though this species can use the precise system (Hauser et al., 2003; Uller et al., 2001).
The tamarins used the simpler, approximate system as a default mechanism unless
the task demanded the more precise system.
Thus, different aspects of the decision environment trigger different mechanisms of
discrimination.
Valuation
Options differ not only in quantity but
also in quality. In many cases, decision makers face choices between qualitatively different reward types, both within and between
reward domains. To choose between different types of food or even between different types of reward (food, water, sex, social
contact), animals must have a mechanism
to evaluate the utility of these reward types;
that is, they must have a valuation mechanism that converts different reward types
into a common currency. Padoa-Schioppa
and colleagues (2006) explored how capuchin monkeys traded off different amounts
of various food types to generate a valuation function (e.g., one piece of apple may be
worth three pieces of carrot). Deaner and col-

leagues (2005) pitted juice rewards against
social information in rhesus macaques. Male
monkeys chose between receiving juice and
viewing images of either higher-ranking
males’ faces, lower-ranking males’ faces, or
female perinea (sexual areas). Interestingly,
the valuation functions showed that the
monkeys would forego juice to view highranking males and female perinea but had to
be “paid” in juice to view low-ranking males.
Comparing these kinds of qualitatively different rewards is a critical capacity for decision making, although we do not have good
cognitive models for how these tradeoffs
occur.
Inhibitory Control
Organisms must not only discriminate the
magnitudes of benefits to establish a preference but also must favor the larger (positive) outcome. When motivated, this is
not a problem for primates (except for very
large rewards; see Silberberg et al., 1998). In
fact, primates have a very difficult time going against this preference. In a task in which
chimpanzees had to point to the smaller
of two rewards to receive the larger reward, they failed miserably (Boysen & Berntson, 1995). In addition to the chimpanzees, bonobos (Pan paniscus), gorillas (Gorilla
gorilla), orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), rhe-
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Figure 2. If utility is a linear function of magnitude (red line), then decision makers should be neutral
to risk; they should be indifferent between a guaranteed banana and a 50/50 chance of no bananas or
two bananas. If utility increases at a decelerating rate with magnitude (blue line), increments of utility are less valuable at larger magnitudes than they are at smaller magnitudes. Satiation offers an important biological example of diminishing utility because limited gut capacity constrains the utility
of excess amounts of food. The additional utility of receiving three over two bananas is high, but the
additional utility of receiving 103 over 102 is not as great, primarily because no one can consume 102
bananas. Diminishing utility implies risk aversion because the additional gain of the risky option is
valued less than the loss.

sus and Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata),
squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus), tamarins, and lemurs (Eulemur fulvus and E. macaco) all fail, at least initially, on this task (Anderson et al., 2000; Genty et al., 2004; Kralik
et al., 2002; Murray et al., 2005; Silberberg &
Fujita, 1996; Vlamings et al., 2006). Clearly,
an unboundedly rational agent would adapt
quickly to the contingencies of this task, but
the preference for a large reward is so powerful that primates cannot inhibit their propensity to choose this. Of course, evolutionarily, it makes sense to employ the simple
heuristic “choose the larger.” When in an organism’s ecology would they opt for a small
reward when a larger is present? This must
occur only rarely.

Uncertainty and Risk
In a letter to Jean-Baptiste Leroy, Benjamin Franklin stated that “in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death
and taxes” (13 November 1789). That leaves
a lot of uncertainty in the world. As agents
navigating in this world, we must deal with
this uncertainty in an adaptive manner.
Knight (1921) posited a useful distinction between uncertainty (not knowing the distribution of possible payoffs) and risk (knowing

the distribution of payoffs but not knowing which payoff will be realized). Though
we and other animals frequently face uncertainty, this is difficult to study in the laboratory, so we will focus on risk.
Risky Gambles
Much of the work undermining classical expected utility theory involved asking
human subjects about their preferences in
risky gambles. Rather than the banana examples suggested previously, subjects chose
between risky reward amounts. Would you
prefer a 50% chance of receiving $100 (and a
50% chance of receiving nothing) or a 100%
chance of receiving $50? Though these two
options have equal expected values, most
people have a strong preference for the sure
thing—they avoid risk. Risk-averse preferences arise with nonlinear utility functions,
specifically when utility increases at a slower
rate than the magnitude of the benefit (Fig.
6.2). In general, this seems to be the case for
human risk preferences for intermediate to
large gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
Interestingly, nonhuman animals seem to
show a similar pattern. Animals typically are
tested by repeatedly experiencing choices similar to the banana examples mentioned pre-
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viously. In a review of risk sensitivity in over
25 species, Kacelnik and Bateson (1996) found
that most species were either risk averse or
risk neutral. Work on primates, however, has
provided a more mixed result. Early tests of
risk sensitivity in rhesus monkeys showed risk
aversion (Behar, 1961). Yet, more recent studies have shown a preference for risky rewards
in these macaques (Hayden & Platt, 2007; McCoy & Platt, 2005) . Meanwhile, cotton-top
tamarins and bonobos (Pan paniscus) seem to
avoid risk, while common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) ignore risk and chimpanzees prefer risk (Heilbronner et al., 2008, unpublished
data). Why does such variation exist?
Variation in Risk Preferences
One of the first hypotheses proposed to
account for differences in risk sensitivity was
the “energy budget rule” (Caraco et al., 1980;
Stephens, 1981). This rule suggests that hungry individuals should prefer risks because
the safe option will not allow them to survive. Though this seems to work in some situations, there is no evidence for this rule in
primates. Hayden and Platt (2007) tested an
alternative idea proposed by Rachlin and colleagues (1986). Instead of preferring risky options because of hunger, animals may prefer
risky options when they require low costs—
specifically, when another choice will arise
soon. Repeatedly choosing the risky option guarantees receiving the large payoff at
some point. With short time delays between
choices, waiting a few more seconds for this
jackpot is not that costly. Rhesus macaques
seem to follow this rule. The macaques preferred the risky option more when facing
shorter delays between choices than with
larger delays (Hayden & Platt, 2007).
The ecological rationality approach may
also account for some of the patterns of risk
preferences seen in primates. In particular,
when species experience risk in their natural ecology, they may have decision rules that
bias them toward risky options. With this hypothesis in mind, Heilbronner and colleagues
(2008) predicted a species difference in risk
preferences between chimpanzees and bonobos. Although their diets overlap quite a bit in
their natural habitat, bonobos feed primarily
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on terrestrial herbaceous vegetation, an abundant and reliable food source, and chimpanzees rely more on fruit, a more temporally and
spatially variable food source (Wrangham &
Peterson, 1996). Moreover, chimpanzees face
risks when they hunt monkeys and other
small mammals; bonobos rarely hunt. Interestingly, wild chimpanzees engage in this
risky activity more often when fruit is abundant rather than scarce, a direct contrast to the
energy budget hypothesis for risk-seeking behavior (Gilby & Wrangham, 2007). Given the
generally higher level of risky choice in chimpanzees, Heilbronner and colleagues predicted that this would select for risk-taking
decision mechanisms. As predicted, chimpanzees preferred the risky choice in a laboratory
experiment, whereas bonobos preferred the
safe option. Therefore, to exploit risky options
in their natural environment, natural selection
has likely endowed chimpanzees with ecologically rational decision mechanisms, yielding
preferences for risky outcomes even in captive
laboratory situations.
The Framing of Risk
Though risk aversion and risk-seeking
preferences do not pose a great challenge to
expected utility theory, framing effects do
challenge the theory. Prospect theory highlights two types of framing effects: reference
dependence and loss aversion (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1991). Reference dependence refers to viewing choices as gains or losses relative to a reference point rather than as absolute increases or decreases in utility. Thus,
a set of outcomes could result in the exact same levels of wealth but be framed as a
gain or loss. In the classic Asian disease problem, a medical treatment has a particular effectiveness in combating a disease (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). However, when the
outcome of a treatment is framed as number of people saved (a gain), subjects prefer the risky option more than when framed
as number of people that die (a loss). Thus,
framing the exact same outcome as either
saving or losing lives greatly influences risk
preferences. Yet, this reference dependence is
not symmetric. People will try to avoid losses
more than they will try to obtain gains—a
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phenomenon termed loss aversion (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1981). We have already shown
that, in risky gambles, people typically avoid
risk over gains. When experiencing a loss
(a sure loss of $50 or a 50% chance of losing
$100), however, people prefer risks to avoid
the guaranteed loss.
Hundreds of studies have documented the
effects of reference dependence and loss aversion in humans (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000).
If this is truly a bias, then we might expect to
find it only in humans. But if framing effects
offer an adaptive, ecologically rational advantage, other animal species may exhibit them.
Though first demonstrated in European starlings (Marsh & Kacelnik, 2002), Chen and
colleagues (2006) explored reference dependence and loss aversion in capuchin monkeys. To test reference dependence, the monkeys chose between two risky options. In one
option, subjects saw one food reward and either received one or two rewards with equal
probability. In the other option, they saw two
rewards and received either one or two rewards with equal probability. Though identical in outcome, the reference point (number
of initial rewards) varied, resulting in a perceived gain or loss. In this condition, subjects
strongly preferred the gain option, showing clear reference dependence. Another experiment tested loss aversion. Here, one option consisted of seeing and then receiving a
single reward, and the other option consisted
of seeing two rewards but always receiving
one. Again, the monkeys faced identical outcomes—a guaranteed one reward—but receiving that one reward could have been
neutral or perceived as a loss. Again, the
monkeys avoided the loss option, revealing
the precursors to loss aversion in nonhuman
primates. Thus, we share framing effects with
other primates, suggesting deep evolutionary
roots for this phenomenon.
Uncertainty Building Blocks
Which evolved capacities does an organism need to cope with uncertainty and risk?
When given a choice between risky gambles,
a decision maker must compare the probabilities of each outcome. In the human risk literature, subjects typically choose based on
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written descriptions of probabilities (e.g.,
a 50% chance) and/or on visual displays
(e.g., a pie chart with half of the circle colored in). These techniques allow fairly accurate discriminations between probabilities.
In the animal risk literature (and in some human experiments; see Hertwig et al., 2004),
the subjects repeatedly experience the outcomes to gauge the level of risk. Therefore,
to choose between gambles, animals must
discriminate probabilities based on experienced outcomes. Though few studies have
explicitly tested this, Weber’s law may describe probability discrimination. Both Herrnstein and Loveland (1975) and Bailey and
Mazur (1990) showed that pigeons’ choices
for the less risky option increased as the ratio between the small to large probability decreased (probabilities became less similar). In
addition, Bailey and Mazur and Krebs et al.
(1978) showed that pigeons and starlings (respectively) took more time to stabilize their
preferences when the ratio between probabilities increased, further suggesting difficulty in discriminating similar probabilities.
Thus, like numerical magnitude, probability discrimination likely follows Weber’s law:
Individuals can discriminate a 10% from a
20% chance better than an 80% from a 90%
chance. This has important implications for
how animals deal with risk. When facing
unlikely events, animals may discriminate
probabilities well and therefore respond appropriately to risk. For more likely events,
however, animals may ignore the probabilities and simply focus on the payoffs to determine choice.

Time
All decisions have a temporal component,
from choosing to search for predators instead
of searching for prey to delaying reproduction until the next breeding season. Delayed
payoffs often have both benefits and costs
(Stevens & Stephens, 2009). They may be
beneficial when investing time in obtaining
resources allows for the extraction of more
resources. For instance, the more time chimpanzees spend fishing for termites, the more
termites they will extract. Yet, delayed rewards often come with a cost.
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Figure 3. Models of intertemporal choice differ in their predictions about how the value of a reward
decreases with the time delay to receiving the reward. Exponential discounting (red line) predicts a
constant rate of decrease over time. Hyperbolic discounting (green line) predicts a decreasing rate of
decrease over time, such that decision makers exhibit high discount rates at short-term delays but
lower discount rates at longer delays. Rate maximization (blue line) predicts similar patterns as hyperbolic, albeit with strange behavior at very small time delays. The advantages of rate maximization
models are that they include repeated choices and have biologically relevant parameters.

Temporal Discounting
When facing options with smaller, sooner
payoffs and larger, later payoffs, animals
must make an intertemporal choice; that is,
they must trade off the magnitude of rewards
with the delay to receiving them (reviewed
in Read, 2004). In some cases, ignoring the
temporal component and choosing based on
magnitude is best, but in other cases, a long
delay may prove too costly. How should animals deal with this tradeoff? They may discount or devalue delayed rewards because
the future.is uncertain. The risk of not collecting a reward grows with delay because
some event may interrupt its collection. For
instance, a predator may interrupt an extended courtship or a bank may collapse before an investment matures. Economists have
modified the expected utility models to create a discounted utility model of delayed benefits (Samuelson, 1937). This model replaces
p from the expected utility model with a discounting function that includes a constant
rate of interruption λ per unit time. Thus, for
a reward amount A delayed for t time units,
DU = e–λt × u(A). Again, utility is difficult to
assess, so most versions of this model drop

utility and just discount the absolute reward
amount: V = A × e–λt . Because the value of a
reward decays exponentially with time, this
is called the exponential model of discounting
(Figure 3).
Though intuitively appealing, the data do
not support the exponential model. Humans,
pigeons, and rats violate predictions of this
model in self-control experiments (Figure 4)
by choosing between a smaller, immediate reward and a larger, delayed reward (Ainslie
& Herrnstein, 1981; Frederick et al., 2002; Mazur, 1987; Richards et al., 1997). In fact, when
choosing between immediately receiving two
pieces of food and waiting for six, rats and pigeons only wait a few seconds for three times
as much food. Animals would have to face extraordinarily (and unrealistically) high interruption rates for discounting by interruptions
to account for this level of impulsivity.
Psychologists proposed an alternative
model that captures the data much better:
the hyperbolic discounting model (Ainslie, 1975;
Mazur, 1987). In the hyperbolic model,6 V =
A/(1 + kt), where k represents a fitted parameter that describes the steepness of discounting. Rather than predict a constant rate of
discounting over time, this model predicts a
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Figure 4. In self-control experiments, animals
face a choice between a small reward (AS) after
a short delay (tS) and a large reward (AL) after
a long delay (tL). The animals wait for an intertrial interval, choose one option, wait the specified delay, consume their food, and then begin
another intertrial interval.

decelerating rate over time—decision makers
steeply discount at short time delays, and the
rate of discounting declines at longer delays
(Figure 3). This model nicely matches the
data in humans, rats, and pigeons (Bickel &
Johnson, 2003; Green et al., 2004). A number
of studies have tested intertemporal choice in
primate species, including cotton-top tamarins, common marmosets, brown capuchins,
long-tailed and rhesus macaques, chimpanzees, and bonobos (Dufour et al., 2007;
Ramseyer et al., 2006; Rosati et al., 2007; Stevens et al., 2005; Szalda-Petree et al., 2004; Tobin et al., 1996). Unfortunately, we have too
few quantitative data on primates to distinguish between these two models. Nevertheless, in cotton-top tamarins and common
marmosets, the rate of discounting slows
with time, contradicting predictions of the
exponential model (Hallinan et al., unpublished manuscript).
Though the hyperbolic model has
achieved great empirical success, it suffers
from a critical disadvantage: like prospect
theory, it is a purely descriptive model. It
cannot make a priori predictions about intertemporal choices and thus lacks explanatory
power (Stevens & Stephens, 2009). In addition, both exponential and hyperbolic models of discounting rest on the assumption of
one-shot choice. In self-control experiments,
however, animals face repeated choices between the same options, and the repeated nature of these experiments has important implications for models of intertemporal choice
(Kacelnik, 2003; Stevens & Stephens, 2009).
Rate
The evolutionary approach to optimal
foraging theory takes as its major assumption the fact that animals maximize their in-

take rate, that is, the amount of food gained
per unit time (Stephens & Krebs, 1986). In the
classic patch-choice scenario, an animal travels among the many patches of food in his
or her environment and extracts resources
from each patch. The question is: At what
point should the animal stop extracting resources from the current patch and move
on to search for a new patch? This scenario
sounds quite similar to the self-control situation tested in the laboratory. Animals must
choose between staying in a patch for a short
time to extract a small gain and staying for
a longer time to extract a larger gain. Optimal foraging theory makes predictions about
how long to stay in a patch: stay until the intake rate drops below the background intake
rate in the environment (Stephens & Krebs,
1986).
The rate-based approach to intertemporal choice has two key advantages over the
standard hyperbolic approach. First, it is by
definition a model of repeated choice. Each
decision faced by animals is embedded in a
series of decisions. Thus, the rate-based approach models choices in situations very similar to the self-control experiments. Second,
rate models provide an explanation of the
pattern of temporal preferences seen in animals rather than just a description. Animals
that maximize their intake rates should survive and reproduce better than their counterparts that do not—rate models are built on a
foundation of evolutionary fitness.
We have sound theoretical reasons to favor rate models, but how do they fare empirically? Actually, quite well. The shortterm rate model makes similar predictions as
the hyperbolic model (Fig. 6.3). Bateson and
Kacelnik (1996) first demonstrated the effectiveness of the short-term rate model in describing choices by European starlings in a
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self-control experiment.7 Stevens and colleagues (2005) then tested a variant of this
model: A/(t + h), where h represents the time
required to handle the food, an important
component of the foraging timeline (Rosati
et al., 2006). Cotton-top tamarins chose the
option that maximized this intake rate. Like
rats and pigeons, the tamarins waited only 6
to 10 seconds for three times as much food.
However, the results do not appear so “impulsive” because we have an explanation for
waiting such short delays that does not require unrealistic rates of interruption (Stevens & Stephens, 2009).
Data on bonobos also agree with rate
maximization predictions, but this time longterm rather than short-term rate predictions
(Rosati et al., 2007). The long-term rate A/(τ
+ t + h) includes τ, the time between trials (or
between patches in the natural scenario). The
long-term rate includes all of the relevant
time intervals, and therefore this is the standard model used in optimal foraging theory.
Why would some species ignore the intertrial
interval while other species include it? An
ecological rationality approach may help answer this question.
Ecological Rationality of
Intertemporal Choice
Tamarins and bonobos match predictions
of rate-based models of intertemporal choice.
Yet, bonobos wait over a minute for three
times as much food, whereas tamarins wait
less than 10 seconds. Why might the tamarins
may use short-term rates when making these
types of choices? An answer lies at the heart
of ecological rationality. Namely, the natural
decision environment strongly shapes the decision mechanisms. Though the self-control
experiments appear similar to natural patchforaging scenarios, a key difference arises: Animals rarely face simultaneous choices in nature but often face sequential choices in patch
situations. Rather than facing two binary options, animals regularly choose to stay or
leave a patch. Stephens and Anderson (2001)
argued that this represents the natural foraging decision that animals typically confront,
and therefore this should be the situation for
which decision mechanisms evolved. Interest-
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ingly, a decision rule that assesses short-term
intake rates in a patch situation will automatically result in long-term rate maximization because they are logically equivalent (Stephens
& Anderson, 2001).
If short- and long-term rules are logically
equivalent, this then may explain why bonobos differ from the tamarins and marmosets.
Both represent “adaptive peaks,” so it does
not matter on which peak a particular species
rests. Each rule, however, has advantages and
disadvantages. The short-term rule has the
advantage of simplicity and possibly higher
accuracy. It is simpler because it ignores information, namely, the intertrial interval. This
may also increase accuracy because, by ignoring this time interval, animals can estimate
much smaller intervals, which results in more
accurate estimates (Stephens et al., 2004). Despite the benefits of the short-term rule, using the long-term rule provides advantages
as well, primarily because it applies broadly
and should result in the “correct” outcome in
most cases. Unfortunately, this is not true for
the short-term rule. Though the short-term
rule works well in patch situations, this does
not directly carry over to the self-control situation (Stephens & Anderson, 2001). In fact,
as shown by the tamarins, the short-term rule
results in “ impulsive” choice in self-control
situations, so the animals do not achieve the
optimal long-term rate of gain. Thus, tamarins may use the short-term rule because it
works well in a natural foraging task-patch
exploitation. When placed in an artificial situation, the rule “misfires.” Bonobos, in contrast, may possess more acute estimation abilities and therefore use the more powerful
long-term rule.
Specialized diets also raise interesting
questions about ecologically rational intertemporal choice. Common marmosets offer
an intriguing case because they specialize on
a rather unique food source: tree exudates.
Marmosets have specialized teeth, as well
as digestive morphology and physiology,
adapted to gouging holes in tree bark and
eating the sap and gum that exude from the
holes (Rylands & de Faria, 1993; Stevenson &
Rylands, 1988). Because this foraging strategy requires waiting for the sap to exude,
Stevens and colleagues (2005) proposed an
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ecologically rational response to this type of
foraging strategy: a decision mechanism that
is biased toward waiting for longer delays.
Compared to the more insectivorous tamarins, marmosets should show stronger preferences for delayed rewards. As predicted,
the marmosets waited longer than tamarins
in a self-control situation, suggesting that the
natural foraging ecology shapes the decision
mechanisms (Stevens et al., 2005).
Intertemporal Building Blocks
Time poses unique cognitive challenges
for organisms. Intertemporal choice combines establishing preferences over rewards
with tracking these payoffs over time. Now,
we explore what kind of cognitive building
blocks might be required to make inter temporal choices.
Time Perception
To cope with delayed rewards, an organism must perceive the delay. Unfortunately,
we know little about primate time perception. We do, however, know a lot about time
perception in rats, which likely applies to primates. Like magnitude judgments, time interval judgments seem to follow Weber’s
law. In fact, Gibbon (1977) showed that variance scaled with magnitude in time perception before applying it to quantification.
Given that both primate numerical judgments (see Chapter 8) and human time perception (Allan, 1998) follow Weber’s law,
likely nonhuman primate time perception
does as well. This has important implications
for the study of intertemporal choice. First,
logarithmic time perception (resulting from
Weber’s law) may result in the hyperbolic
pattern of intertemporal choice typically seen
in both humans and other animals (Takahashi, 2005; Takahashi et al., 2008) . This finding could rescue the exponential model of
discounting by overlaying a subjective time
perception function. Second, as we have already seen, long time delays make discriminating the delays difficult. If time delays
are viewed as equivalent, decision makers
should opt for the larger (and therefore later)
reward, resulting in more patient choice.
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Delayed Gratification
In addition to perceiving time, delayed
rewards require a motivational ability to
wait—decision makers must delay gratification. Mischel and colleagues pioneered the
study of delayed gratification by measuring
how long children would wait for delayed
rewards (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel et
al., 1989). They recorded the ability to wait at
different ages and showed that delayed gratification at a young age strongly predicted intelligence, academic success, standardized
test scores, and drug use much later in life.
Beran and colleagues have tested primates in a similar paradigm by offering
chimpanzees and rhesus macaques a stream
of food rewards (Beran et al., 1999; Evans &
Beran, 2007b). The experimenter placed rewards in front of the subjects one by one at a
particular rate, say one every 10 seconds. If
the subject began consuming the food, however, the experimenter stopped the flow of
food. Chimpanzees performed quite well
on this task and some waited for over 10
minutes for the stream of food to be completed (Beran & Evans, 2006). This corroborates findings in the self-control task in
which chimpanzees wait longer than any
other species tested so far, including bonobos (Dufour et al., 2007; Rosati et al., 2007).
Interestingly, this ability can be influenced
by attentional factors. Evans and Beran
(2007a) found that offering chimpanzees a
distraction during the waiting period could
significantly increase their abilities to delay gratification. Thus, delayed gratification
could provide a key building block required
for patient choice, but it too is mediated by
other factors such as attention.

Conclusion
Bounded rationality and ecological rationality are both firmly grounded in an evolutionary perspective on decision making.
Natural selection places limitations on cognitive capacities and tailors cognitive mechanisms to the environment in which they are
used (Barkow et al., 1992; Stevens, 2008). Darwin (1871, 1872) emphasized a continuity be-
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tween the “mental powers” of humans and
other animals, and the analysis provided here
confirms a similar continuity for decision
making. Nonhuman primates show many
of the so-called biases or anomalies demonstrated by human decision makers. The human decision-making literature has highlighted these results as failures to achieve a
normative outcome. The evolutionary approach suggests that the bias lies not in the
behavior but in the normative criteria used.
Organisms did not evolve to follow a mathematically tractable set of principles—rather,
natural selection favored decision strategies
that resulted in greater survival and reproduction. In some cases, the evolutionary and
normative perspectives may overlap. However, the normative perspective often fails to
properly account for the role of the environment in decision making, whereas this is a
critical part of the evolutionary view. Natural
selection shapes decision strategies to match
the environment.
This lesson about the limitations of the
normative approach is an important one
because many fields, especially neuroscience, use tools borrowed from economics to
greatly expand the study of decision making. Though this could prove a fruitful enterprise, the data on decision making in
other animals caution against relying exclusively on the normative models of decision
making. As a biological science, neuroscience should heed the warning of Dobzhansky (1964): “nothing makes sense in biology except in light of evolution” (p. 449). Of
course, the emphasis on evolutionarily plausible models is nothing new to the field of
neuroethology, and this tradition should
continue in the study of decision making.
Rather than looking for expected or discounted utility in the brain, perhaps we
should test hypotheses about the bounded
and ecological rationality of decision making. The bounded rationality approach
makes clear predictions about what cognitive building blocks might be recruited, and
neuroscience can help test this. In addition,
neuroscience can allow us to explore what
aspects of the environment are relevant for
triggering specific decision rules. The neu-
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roethological approach offers an ideal interface between the evolutionary and mechanistic approaches to decision making.
The study of primate decision making
has much to offer the larger field of decision
making, and prospects are bright for future
contributions. To advance the field, we must
begin exploring primate decisions in the wild
or at least in more naturalistic situations.
Currently, most studies of primate decisions
(and animal decisions more broadly) occur
in the laboratory with rather artificial scenarios. Though these studies provide valuable information on primate decision making, they may also lead us astray. If natural
selection tailors decision mechanisms to the
environment in which they are adapted, then
the artificial nature of the laboratory might
not trigger the appropriate mechanism. In
this case, behavior seen in both humans and
other animals may simply be spurious results elicited by an unnatural environment
(Houston et al., 2007b; Stevens & Stephens,
2009). Thus, exploring natural behaviors in
natural environments underlies our understanding of primate decisions.
Another important advance that primate
researchers may offer is the development
and testing of process models of decision
making. David Marr (1982) introduced the
idea of three levels of information processing. The computational level emphasizes the
goal of the system, the algorithmic level emphasizes the processes used, and the implementational level emphasizes the neural circuitry required to process information. Most
models of decision making in animals act at
the computational level—that is, level of evolutionary function—in the field of behavioral ecology or the implementational level
in the field of neurobiology. The algorithmic level has been greatly neglected as a relevant level of analysis. Yet, adding an analysis of the relevant cognitive processes and
algorithms could constrain and improve evolutionary models of decision making. Only
an integrative approach across these levels of
analysis—from the evolutionary to the psychological to the neurobiological—will yield
satisfying answers to questions of the nature
of decision making.
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Notes
1. Utility does not necessarily increase linearly
with magnitude. The difference between
consuming one and three bananas is not the
same as the difference between consuming
11 and 13 bananas. A difference of two bananas is much more relevant when there are
fewer to begin with.
2. Kahneman and Tversky do not use the term
“ irrational.” They describe deviations from
the normative theory as “ biases,” “fallacies,” or “cognitive illusions.” Nevertheless,
the emphasis on putative errors highlights
the irrational nature of human decision
making (Rieskamp et al., 2006a).
3. Most work on decision making in animals,
including primates, involves food as the reward, though there are important exceptions (Deaner et al., 2005). Therefore, in this
review, I will also focus on food as the reward domain. Nevertheless, many of the
principles mentioned here apply to other reward domains, and the study of animal decision making needs more in-depth exploration of other reward types.
4. Though we have few data on transitive preference, transitive inference is well studied in primates. Transitive preference refers to an ordered preference over choices. Transitive
inference refers to the ability to infer a transitive relation between objects (Vasconcelos,
2008). For instance, if individual A is dominant to B, and B is dominant to C, can an individual infer that A is dominant to C without
actually seeing A and C interact? Primates
are quite good at these tasks, both with arbitrary objects in artificial laboratory tasks (reviewed in Tomasello & Call, 1997) and with
social agents in the more naturalistic social inferences (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990).
5. Despite the sparse data on animal intransitivity, Houston and colleagues (Houston,
1997; Houston et al., 2007a) have developed
a series of models demonstrating that intransitivity might be a perfectly adaptive
strategy when a decision maker is either
updating his or her assessment of the environment or betting on a changing environment. Schuck-Paim and Kacelnik (2004)
also assert that intransitive choices (particularly when food is the reward) can be perfectly biologically rational (Kacelnik, 2006)
when the internal state changes (i.e., decision makers become satiated).
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6. Though V = A/(1 + kt) is called the hyperbolic
model, it represents only a single instance
from a class of hyperbolic models. In fact,
most nonexponential models (including the
rate models) are hyperbolic. Nevertheless,
the term “hyperbolic discounting” typically
refers to Mazur’s (1987) version.
7. The key difference between the short-term
and long-term rate models is that the shortterm model ignores the travel time or intertrial interval. Thus, animals using the
short-term rate only focus on the times between choice presentation and reward
consumption.
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